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XV. Social Security and Public Welfare
R. GEORGE WRIGHT*
This inaugural Survey Article recognizes the substantial and
increasing importance of Indiana law and of the relationship between
state and federal law in the frequently litigated area of social security
and public welfare. As is typical of the area, the relevant law has
changed rapidly on several fronts during the past survey period. If
any underlying theme emerges, it is that of an increased tension be-
tween the laudable goals of welfare-oriented policies and perceived
budgetary constraints. A generally positive result of this unfortunate
clash of priorities has been an enhanced concern for program fiscal
integrity.
A. Indiana Medicaid Law
1. Medicaid Co-Payments and Injunctive Relief -In Claus v. Smith,'
the plaintiff Medicaid recipients sought to preliminarily enjoin the
Indiana Department of Public Welfare from requiring, in its discre-
tion, nominal payments by a recipient for certain nonmandatory
Medicaid services.2 The district court ordered the injunction based on
findings of a substantial likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits
and of irreparable harm to the plaintiffs were the co-payment scheme
to be effected.'
Of interest in this case was the unusually generous irreparable
harm determination. The court found that such harm was "certain to
result in this case"' but went on to elaborate that:
The plaintiffs . . . may not be able to afford the nominal
co-payment. Thus, the imposition of a co-payment requirement
may result in their failure to obtain certain non-mandatory
Medicaid services. Failure to obtain medical services can result
*Associate with the firm of Livingston, Dildine, Haynie & Yoder-Fort Wayne,
Indiana. A.B., University of Virginia, 1972; Ph.D., Indiana University, 1976; J.D., Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis, 1982.
'519 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
'The Indiana statutory authority for imposing these charges is IND. CODE
12-1-7-16(c), (d) (Supp. 1981) (amended 1982 to exempt additional nonmandatory services
from being subject to co-payment). IND. CODE S 12-1-7-14.9 (Supp. 1981) (amended 1982),
referred to in statutory subsection (c) above, was construed in Wilson v. Stanton, 424
N.E.2d 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
'519 F. Supp. at 831. Contra Crane v. Mathews, 417 F. Supp. 532, 539-40 (N.D.
Ga. 1976). Experimental co-payment requirements have been upheld under Medi-Cal
in California Welfare Rights Org. v. Richardson, 348 F. Supp. 491 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
4519 F. Supp. at 831. The court in Crane v. Mathews found the threatened harm
too speculative. 417 F. Supp. at 540. The court in Claus may have considered Crane
irrelevant in view of the temporary nature of the co-payment program in Crane.
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in medical problems becoming worse or even untreatable. Im-
plementation of the co-payment scheme would result in
irreparable harm to the plaintiffs.5
Given this language and the absence of a finding that the plaintiffs
would require nonexempt, nonmandatory Medicaid services, and par-
ticularly in light of the Department's statutory discretion to waive
co-payment requirements in cases of undue hardship,' any irreparable
harm threatened in this case would, in the court's own implicit admis-
sion, seem highly contingent and speculative rather than "certain."
Elsewhere, a court has held that "[a]llegations of mere speculative
or contingent injury, with nothing to show in fact that it will occur,
are insufficient to support a prayer for injunctive relief."7 This restric-
tive approach to injunctive relief is grounded in the traditional cautious
reluctance to grant such an extraordinary remedy.8 It may be argued,
though, that the court in Claus did no more than extend the kind of
interest-balancing undertaken in a due process context by the Supreme
Court in Goldberg v. Kelly9 to the context of a preliminary injunction
request.
2. Medicaid Reimbursement and Subrogation Rights.-In State v.
Cowdell,'° the State of Indiana and the Department of Public Welfare
appealed a circuit court judgment awarding them only a one-fifth reim-
bursement of Medicaid funds expended by them from the proceeds
of a litigation settlement between the Medicaid recipient and the in-
juring party. On appeal, no abuse of discretion was found."
The plaintiffs in this case relied on a state administrative regula-
tion allowing state subrogation to the claims of Medicaid recipients
"to the extent of Medicaid benefits received by the recipients . ,,-"
On appeal, the court found this language consistent with the nature
of subrogation as an equitable doctrine, the extent of its application,
therefore, being subject to the equities of the particular case. 3 In this
'519 F. Supp. at 831 (emphasis added).
'IND. CODE S 12-1-7-16(d) (1982).
'Stephens v. Bacon Park Comm'rs, 212 Ga. 426, 428, 93 S.E.2d 351, 351-52 (1956).
See also Powell v. Garmany, 208 Ga. 550, 67 S.E.2d 781 (1951).
'See, e.g., Barcelo v. Brown, 478 F. Supp. 646 (D.P.R. 1979); Orion Broadcasting,
Inc. v. Forsythe, 477 F. Supp. 198 (W.D. Ky. 1979); Rivera v. Blum, 98 Misc. 2d 1002,
420 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
'397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (balancing "brutal need" against possible additional public
expense in passing on the need for a pretermination hearing for welfare recipients).
421 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
"Id. at 672.
12470 IND. ADMIN. CODE S 5-1-11 (1979). County departments of public welfare are
now accorded subrogation rights under IND. CODE S 12-5-6-9 (1982). The federal statute
and regulation mandating this subrogation action were discussed in another context
in 81 Op. Att'y Gen. 15 (May 15, 1981).421 N.E.2d at 671.
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instance, however, the only unaccounted-for equity was the plaintiffs'
failure to pay their pro rata share of the Medicaid recipient's attorney
fees in obtaining the tort settlement. Although the court cited an
analogous New Mexico case14 involving an almost equally serious
disparity between the subrogation award and extent of the subrogee's
payment to the subrogor, the court failed to give guidance as to its
reasoning in finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court award.
Examples of more explicitly justified and more generous subrogation
awards, however, can be found in Indiana and elsewhere. 5
3. Deemed Availability of Noninstitutionalized Spouse's Funds for
Medicaid Eligibility Purposes. -Brown v. Smith6 was the result of the
Supreme Court's memorandum decision in Stanton v. Brown"7 to vacate
the Seventh Circuit's judgment in Brown v. Stanton"8 and to remand
the case in light of the Supreme Court case of Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers."
In Gray Panthers, the Court had held that, for Medicaid entitle-
ment and benefit amount determinations, Congress had authorized"
the states, under appropriate circumstances, to impute to an institu-
tionalized spouse the income or resources of a noninstitutionalized
spouse.2' The Court stated that:
"Available" resources are different from those in hand. We
think that the requirement of availability refers to resources
left to a couple after the spouse has deducted a sum on which
to live. It does not, as respondent argues, permit the State
only to consider the resources actually paid by the spouse to
the applicant.22
The Court cited Judge Pell's opinion, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part in Brown v. Stanton, for the impracticality of requiring
states to first adjust upwards the institutionalized spouse's Medicaid
"White v. Sutherland, 92 N.M. 187, 585 P.2d 331 (1978).
"See, e.g., Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Henson, 217 Ind. 554, 29 N.E.2d 873 (1940);
Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Dulin, 69 Ind. App. 363, 122 N.E. 3 (1919). See also Stan-
ford v. Aulick, 124 Ariz. 487, 605 P.2d 465 (1979); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Ford, 172
N.J. Super. 242, 411 A.2d 736 (Law Div. 1979); Columbia County v. Randall, 49 Or.
App. 643, 620 P.2d 937 (1980). If the Department acts before final settlement, the Cowdell
subrogation problem may now be avoidable under a new provision of the Indiana Code.
IND. CODE S 12-1-7-24.6 (1982).
1662 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1981).
"453 U.S. 97 (1981).
617 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir. 1980).
"453 U.S. 34 (1981).
2See 42 U.S.C. S 1396a(a)(17)(B), (D) (1976). The provision is discussed in another
context in 81 Op. Att'y Gen. 15 (May 11, 1981).
453 U.S. at 48.
'Id. (emphasis in the original).
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benefits and then proceed under a state spousal support statute to
attempt to obtain reimbursement from a recalcitrant noninstitutional-
ized spouse."
On remand, the court in Brown v. Smith held that although Gray
Panthers had sanctioned, in the abstract, Medicaid deeming or the
imputation of spousal income, the Court had left untouched the re-
quirement of an "individualized factual determination of the noninstitu-
tionalized spouse's needs in computing the potentially available funds
subject to deeming.""4 This requirement seems administratively
manageable as long as the burden of showing unavailability of the
apparently available funds is shouldered by the claimant's spouse with
some verification of expenses required. The cost of individualized
determinations would further seem worth paying if such a procedure
obviated any necessity for a divorce or for a reduction in part-time
work effort based on the press of financial necessity.
4. Medicaid Benefit Termination and the Exhaustion Require-
ment. -In Evans v. Stanton,2" the court of appeals upheld the dismissal
of the plaintiff's complaint against the Indiana and Marion County
Departments of Public Welfare. The plaintiffs Medicaid benefits had
been terminated without a prior hearing because of the plaintiffs
failure to timely file for appeal. The plaintiff sought reinstatement,
damages for medical expenses and due process violations, attorney
fees, class action certification, and declaratory and injunctive relief.
The court of appeals, in this case, required exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies on the grounds that the plaintiffs constitutional
claims were pressed not alone but in conjunction with unresolved fac-
tual claims regarding his continuing eligibility and on the grounds that"expedient administrative procedures" were available.26 An additional
consideration was the Public Welfare Departments' relative expertise
in administering the challenged regulations."
Waiver of administrative exhaustion requirements has been recom-
mended under similar circumstances." The appellate court referred
'Id. at 46. Judge Pell's language has been further quoted by Chief Justice Burger,
dissenting in Herweg v. Ray, 102 S. Ct. 1059, 1069 (1982). Gray Panthers is discussed
briefly in Note, 20 J. FAM. L. 369 (1982).
24662 F.2d at 468 (citing Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 49 n.21 (1981)).
The Seventh Circuit's prior discussion of this requirement is in Brown v. Stanton,
617 F.2d 1224, 1227-28 (7th Cir. 1980).
25419 N.E.2d 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).2 1d. at 255. Compare id. (no finding of such severe or imminent harm as would
justify waiver of exhaustion) with Claus v. Smith, 519 F. Supp. 829, 831 (N.D. Ind.
1981) (finding irreparable harm substantial enough to justify preliminary injunction).
See supra text accompanying notes 4-6.
27419 N.E.2d at 255 (discussing 470 IND. ADMIN. CODE S 9-7-3 (1979)).
28See Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis of the Indiana
Township Assistance System, 6 IND. L. REV. 385, 393-94 (1973).
[Vol. 16:339
SURVEY-SOCIAL SECURITY
to several Indiana exhaustion cases2 without discussing the occa-
sionally illuminating and generally more liberal federal authority. The
holding in Evans may be instructively contrasted with that of the
Supreme Court in the well-known case of Mathews v. Eldridge,3" as
acutely expounded by Professor Davis:
The holding [of Eldridge] is, in precise terms, that a review-
ing court may decide a question not raised before the agency
and may decide a constitutional issue when the moving party
has not exhausted administrative remedies on nonconstitutional
issues . . . even when "the only avenue for judicial review"
is a statute which requires exhaustion "as a jurisdictional pre-
requisite," ... even when the party seeking review is entitled
to apply for a reconsideration, including a hearing, and does
not do so .... even when the agency on reconsideration might
reach a favorable decision which would make a determination
of the constitutional question unnecessary .... "
In sum, while the result in Evans seems sound, it is to be hoped that
in an appropriate case, specifically, one involving impending signifi-
cant irreparable medical harm to the plaintiff, each of the numerous
considerations recognized in Evans32 militating against waiving exhaus-
tion, including the presence of unresolved factual issues, will be seen
to be outweighed.
5. State Participation in Medicaid and Preventive Health Care for
Children.-Bond v. Stanton3 involved a class action civil rights suit
contending that Indiana failed to implement an appropriate preven-
tive health care program for children as required" of all states par-
ticipating in the Medicaid program. On appeal, the plaintiffs main-
tained, and the Seventh Circuit held, that Indiana's Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program did not
minimally specify what particular tests were required, that Indiana
had not identified those Medicaid providers willing and able to per-
form EPSDT tests, and that the state had not monitored the tests
given or required appropriate diagnosis and follow up treatment of
examinees."
'Most notably, to Wilson v. Board of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 385 N.E.2d 438
(Ind.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874 (1979).
'424 U.S. 319 (1976).
31K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE S 20.16, at 292-93 (Supp. 1982). See also
Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972) (per curiam) (Indiana welfare regulation case
brought in federal court as a section 1983 action; administrative exhaustion not required).
341"9 N.E.2d at 255 (quoting Indiana Dep't of Welfare v. Stagner, 410 N.E.2d
1348, 1351 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
"655 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1981).
'442 U.S.C. S 1396d(a)(4)(B) (1976).
655 F.2d at 769.
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The court reasoned that "[w]ithout a thorough screening, including
for example appropriate laboratory tests and a nutritional assessment,
two diseases known to be among the leading health problems of poor
children-malnutrition and lead poisoning-may well go undetected
or unprevented." 8 This analysis compares quite favorably with that
of the court in Wisconsin Welfare Rights Organization v. Newgent.37
In Newgent, the court correctly noted that the regulatory authority
for requiring the extensive testing approved of in Bond was of a non-
binding interpretive rule character,38 but the Newgent court departed
from the spirit of Bond in finding that evidence that only 1.5 percent
of those examined had received a sickle cell test, or that only 9.3 per-
cent had received a lead poisoning test, did not indicate, without other
evidence, a lack of aggressive EPSDT implementation in Wisconsin. 9
Thus, the court in Bond was more aggressive than the Newgent court
with respect to monitoring the administration of the EPSDT program."
B. Uncompensated Hill-Burton Costs as Reimbursable
Medicare Costs
In Johnson County Memorial Hospital v. Schweiker,"' the plaintiffs
were fifty-one Indiana hospitals that had participated both in the
federal Medicare program and in the Hill-Burton Act grant program.
Under the latter program, grants for hospital construction or improve-
ment are tied to providing a certain measure of free hospital care
not reimbursed under Hill-Burton." Judge Dillin determined that the
policy aim of having the costs of treating Medicare beneficiaries borne
by the Medicare program and of having Medicare not bear the costs
of serving non-Medicare patients was served by interpreting the Hill-
Burton free care costs as an imposed legal duty of the hospitals and
a proportionately reimbursable indirect cost under the Medicare
program." "The Medicare patients benefit from the improved physical
plant which results from Hill-Burton grants as they benefit from other ...'necessary and proper costs' such as heating and lighting."" The cost
a'Id.
3433 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (decided, however, on plaintiffs motion for
summary judgment for declaratory and injunctive relief).
"I1d. at 213. See also Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 179 n.7 (7th Cir. 1981).
3433 F. Supp. at 214-15.
'"Compare 655 F.2d at 770 with 433 F. Supp. at 211-12, 215. See also Rosenbaum,
The Medicaid Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment Program: HEW's
New Regulations, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 742, 742 (1980) (discussing the need for ag-
gressive EPSDT implementation)."527 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
442 U.S.C. S 291 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
'1527 F. Supp. at 1139.
"Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. S 405.451(b)(2) (1980)).
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of the free care obligation was found to be so similar to interest
payments on building loans that not to classify such free care cost
along with the expressly reimbursable interest on borrowed funds
would be arbitrary and capricious. 5 Finally, the cost of free care was
found not to be excluded from reimbursement as charity because the
free care obligation was legally enforceable. 6
Roughly one month after the decision in Johnson County Memorial
Hospital was issued, the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois reached a contrary result in Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital
Center v. Department of HHS.7 The court in Saint Mary of Nazareth
Hospital Center saw the free care costs as excluded charity' and found
the connection between Hill-Burton construction or modernization and
Medicare recipients, in particular, as too attenuated to qualify for
reimbursement.49 The court concluded that "it would be illogical" and
in the nature of double-dipping "to obligate hospitals to provide a cer-
tain amount of free health care to indigents as compensation for receiv-
ing federal funds and then reimburse the hospital, again with federal
funds, for the obligation incurred through the initial receipt of federal
monies. '
This latter contention was recently addressed in Metropolitan
Medical Center v. Harris.51 Looking to the legislative history of the
Hill-Burton Act, the District Court of Minnesota found "no evidence
of any intent to require a hospital to pay for rendering the free care,
only that the facilities be made available to all people,"52 without
regard to the hospitalized person's financial position. By itself,
however, this policy would not dictate that the participating hospital
be technically overcompensated for such free care provision.
C. Tightening of Welfare Benefit Standards
The persistent theme of the impingement of practical budgetary
constraints on questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation
was manifested in Foster v. Center Township.3 On cross motions for
summary judgment, the court in Foster found that while a federal
'1527 F. Supp. at 1140. Characterizing a failure to classify free care costs with
interest payments as "contrary to law" would technically seem a more suitable ground
for reversal; it is hardly arbitrary to distinguish the two.
461d.
'531 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ill. 1982).4Id. at 422. Contra St. James Hosp. v. Harris, 535 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Il. 1981).
41531 F. Supp. at 421.
'4Id. at 422.
'1524 F. Supp. 630 (D. Minn. 1981).
"Id. at 633. See also Iredell Memorial Hosp. v. Schweiker, 535 F. Supp. 795, 799
(W.D.N.C. 1982).
1527 F. Supp. 377 (N.D. Ind.), affd mere., 673 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1981).
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statute4 prevents a state from lowering its guaranteed income level
for welfare recipients to take food stamps into account, it is permissi-
ble for a state to lower its guaranteed level for other reasons, such
as to prevent the insolvency of its welfare benefit system.55 Because
a genuine issue of material fact remained as to Center Township's
reason for decreasing the guaranteed income level, the court held that
summary judgment was inappropriate.'
Authority is available to support the court's determination that
congressional intent "was to guarantee that food stamps would be
available not in substitution for, but in addition to, any welfare
payments already provided by states."5' The crucial practical problem
appears to be the evidentiary one of distinguishing a proscribed in-
direct linkage of benefit levels to food stamp availability from reduc-
tion of or failure to increase benefit levels because of perceived budget
constraints. To a certain extent, these two justifications may not even
be conceptually distinct.
In Stanton v. Smith,5" the action of the Indiana State Welfare
Board in ratably reducing, by twenty-five percent, the financial stand-
ards measure used to determine minimum essential needs for Aid
to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients was chal-
lenged on the typically unavailing grounds of improper legislative
delegation. The legislature had specified simply that such reduction
was to be carried out and could not exceed thirty-five percent.59 The
Welfare Board, thereupon, held hearings to select a suitable reduc-
tion percentage. The Attorney General and the Governor were privy
to the hearings and, with the Department of HEW, approved the
Welfare Board's twenty-five percent reduction figure."0 The supreme
court held that the delegation was not improper in view of the exis-
tence of legislative standards designed to guide the exercise of the
Welfare Board's discretion."
It is clear that one of the Welfare Board's guidelines was the
state's statutory obligation "to provide minimum standards of
assistance which would provide reasonable subsistence to the most
-7 U.S.C. S 2017(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
5527 F. Supp. at 379.
"Id.
"7Id. See, e.g., Dupler v. City of Portland, 421 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Me. 1976). For
a discussion of some of the tenth amendment issues inherent in this type of statute,
see State v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 411-14 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
'429 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1981). For further discussion of this case, see Smith, Ad-
ministrative Law, 1982 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 16 IND. L. REV.
1, 22 (1983).





needy children."62 What is not indicated by the opinion is how the
selected reduction figure relates to this standard, or more generally,
how this figure relates to any policy or evidentiary basis for choosing
the twenty-five percent reduction as opposed to any other particular
figure between zero and thirty-five. While the reasoning process of
the Welfare Board was not called into question on review, it does
not seem appropriate to conclude, as the supreme court did, that "the
action taken [by the Welfare Board] was subject to sufficient input
and control to prevent arbitrary action."63 Arbitrariness is most
directly controllable through a required statement of reasons or
grounds for the administrative rule promulgated, rather than through
official participation."
D. Local Welfare Assistance
The legal relationship between the township trustee and the
county board of commissioners was at issue in Perry Township v.
Hedrick.5 In Hedrick, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
grant of a writ of mandamus to compel the trustee to comply with
the board of commissioners' order to pay the plaintiff's delinquent
utility bill.' The commissioners had reversed the trustee's initial denial
of assistance to the plaintiff, Hedrick, and the court of appeals held
that from that point, "the trustee was under a clear legal duty to
comply with the order by performing the ministerial act of paying
Hedrick's delinquent electric bill." 7 The court noted that "[n]o provi-
sion in the general assistance statute is made for the trustee to ap-
peal the Commissioners' decision."68
62Id.
"Id.
4See generally 5 U.S.C. S 553(c) (1976); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
5 6:12 (1978 & Supp. 1980). Indiana statutory provisions on Welfare Board administrative
rulemaking impose no comparable "statement of purpose" requirement. See IND. CODE
55 4-22-2-4, -5 (1982); IND. CODE S 12-1-2-2, -3 (1982). But see Greenberg, Administrative
Law, 1980 Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Law, 14 IND. L. REV. 65, 68-69
(1981). The value of a statement of reasons requirement even in the absence of statutory
mandate is extolled in Tri-State Generation and Transmission Ass'n v. Environmental
Quality Council, 590 P.2d 1324, 1330-31 (Wyo. 1979), and a statutory mandate itself
is endorsed in the 1981 MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT S 3-110, 14 U.L.A. 66 (Supp.
1982).
'"429 N.E.2d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
"Id. at 318.
"7Id. at 317. See Rosenberg, Overseeing the Poor: A Legal-Administrative Analysis
of the Indiana Township Assistance System, 6 IND. L. REV. 385, 393 (1973).
0429 N.E.2d at 317. A somewhat similar issue was determined in accord with
the Hedrick result in Smythe v. Lavine, 76 Misc. 2d 751, 351 N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct.
1974) (county social service commissioner not empowered to seek judicial review of
immediate supervisor's aid determination). In Attorney General v. Board of Pub. Welfare,
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The lack of symmetry between the individual claimant's right to
appeal69 and that of the trustee should not be disturbing, especially
in view of the trustee's ability to make subsequent eligibility deter-
minations with respect to the claimant. If the Indiana statutory
characterization of the trustee as the "overseer of the poor"7' is to
be meaningful in this context, it must imply a diminished sense of
legal adversariness on the part of the trustee." The smooth function-
ing of county government also weighs in this direction, and the burden
of administrative and judicial appellate delay on potential welfare
recipients 3 is obviously substantial."
E. Social Security Disability Claims
The manipulability and occasional harshness of substantial
evidence review were successively manifested in two significant
disability benefit decisions handed down by the Seventh Circuit.
In Cassiday v. Schweiker," the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed a denial of Social Security disability benefits by Chief
Judge Eschbach of the Northern District of Indiana."6 The case
328 Mass. 446, 104 N.E.2d 496 (1952), mandamus was held to lie to compel a local
board of public welfare to make payments in accordance with a determination by the
state department of public welfare.
6 See IND. CODE S 12-2-1-18 (1982). Appeal of general assistance aid denials in Indiana
is discussed in Note, General Assistance Programs: Review and Remedy of Administrative
Actions in Indiana, 47 IND. L.J. 393 (1972).
7 See IND. CODE S 12-2-1-6.3 (1982).
7 Id. S 12-2-1-18.
71t might be said that the trustee owes a divided quasi-fiduciary duty to both
current claimants and to future claimants, with the latter embodying the value of the
integrity of funding. In an analogous setting, the Secretary is not afforded an appeal
of administrative decisions in favor of Social Security Supplementary Security Income
claimants beyond that provided for in 20 C.F.R. S 416.1455 (1981).7'See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (discussing termination, as opposed
to the initial granting, of benefits).7 While Hedrick was the most significant state welfare system case decided on
appeal during the past survey period, several cases merit at least brief mention. In
Vanderburgh County Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Prindle, 419 N.E.2d 239 (Ind. Ct. App.
1981), the court of appeals located the responsibility for medical and hospital care
of Indiana resident indigents injured out of state but treated in state with the county
of the indigent's residence. This result has not been changed by the repeal of the
statute involved nor by enactment, effective January 1, 1982, of the new governing
statute, IND. CODE §§ 12-5-6-1 to -11 (1982). The problem in Trustees of Indiana Univ. v.
County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 426 N.E.2d 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) of eligibility stan-
dards for hospital assistance is now resolved by section 12-5-6-2(c) of the Indiana Code
and by regulations promulgated thereunder. See 470 IND. ADMIN. CODE S 11-1-1 (Supp.
1982).
" 663 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981).
"Chief Judge Eschbach joined the Seventh Circuit on December 12, 1981, some
five weeks after the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cassiday.
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developed from a decision by Indiana Rehabilitation Services" to
discontinue Mrs. Cassiday's benefits on the grounds that her
symptoms"8 no longer prevented her from engaging in substantial gain-
ful employment."9
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit conceded the difficulty in
evaluating the claim in question but found the Administrative Law
Judge's (ALJ) approach to the evidence to be "highly selective" 0 and
arbitrary, not in any particular instance, but in cumulative effect."
Neither the decision to terminate benefits nor the ALJ's determina-
tion that the claimant had willfully refused prescribed treatment was
found to be based on substantial evidence in the record. 2
Substantial evidence in the record, as a whole, has been classi-
cally described as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion"" or as "enough to justify,
if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the con-
clusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury."'" In
this case, nine physicians" either treated, examined, or reviewed the
claimant or her medical records during the relevant period. The
treating physicians apparently tended to view the claimant's condi-
tion as more severely disabling than the majority of the examining
physicians or the evenly split reviewing physicians. The Seventh Cir-
cuit was willing to "direct a verdict," despite this obvious equivocality,
in view of case law according the opinion of a treating physician
"In accordance with the national pattern, Indiana Rehabilitation Services acts
under contract with the Social Security Administration. 663 F.2d at 746.7 1d. (the symptoms included "pain, numbness, tingling, and weakness in her arms
and hands" and chest pain, brought on by occlusion of blood vessels and nerve root
compression).
"Id. See 42 U.S.C. S 423 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 20 C.F.R. CS 404.1501 to -.1574
& app. 2 (1981).
"663 F.2d at 749.
"Id. at 748.
'Id. at 750.
"Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938), quoted in NLRB
v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). See also Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
477-87 (1951).
'NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
"Inefficient over-utilization of expensive physician time in the disability adjudica-
tion process is common. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (six examining
physicians and one reviewing physician relied upon); Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d
1078 (5th Cir. 1981) (eight examining physicians and one examining psychologist in-
volved); Anderson v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1981) (ten examining physicians
involved); Roy v. Secretary of HHS, 512 F. Supp. 1245 (C.D. Ill. 1981) (six examining




greater weight than that of a physician who has examined the claim-
ant only once.8
Ideally, this case would have been remanded for vocational expert
testimony. What should be sought from physicians is their opinion
as to a claimant's physical or medical condition, not whether the clai-
mant falls into the legal category of "disabled," or even whether the
claimant's relationship to the relevant job market is such that she
is capable of "sedentary light work" or "light sedentary work."8 Each
of the latter quoted expressions is legally meaningless under the ap-
plicable disability regulations.88
The Seventh Circuit also found insufficient evidence to sustain
the ALJ's determination that the claimant's case fell under the regula-
tion barring disability status to one who willfully refuses prescribed
treatment. 9 The appellate court declared its willingness to hang the
weight of a disability determination on the distinction between a physi-
cian's "prescribing" surgery-an unidiomatic usage in itself-and"recommending" surgery. The claimant's reasons for declining treat-
ment may be frivolous or amount to sheer opportunism as long as
the latter characterization, and not the former, is applied to the physi-
cian's remedy.
In the second disability benefits case, Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard far more deferen-
tially. In Cummins v. Schweikerl the court of appeals upheld the denial
of disability benefits by the District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana, relying in part on the controversial new medical-vocational
guidelines or grid regulations. 1
8 See Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d 781, 786 (7th Cir. 1977). Cf Cummins v.
Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1982) (refusing to accord decisive weight to the
opinion of a long-time family physician).
87663 F.2d at 747. Increased use of vocational expert testimony would also mitigate
any perceived battles between government-employed physicians and sympathetic family
physicians. Compare Cummins v. Schweiker, 670 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1982) with Richard-
son v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 414 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1567 (1981).
9See id. S 404.1518 (1980).
9670 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1982).
'20 C.F.R. S 404.1501 to -.1569 & app. 2 (1981). Under these regulations, a severely
impaired claimant prevented from doing his past work and not currently doing signifi-
cant work is categorized based on the level of work exertion he is capable of, his
age, education, and nature of work experience, and the transferability of any acquired
job skills to other job settings. The individual findings are then simply programmed
into the appropriate Appendix 2 Grid. Nonexertional limitations aside, if the precise
combination of findings in a given case is explicitly provided for in one of the grids,
the claimant is determined by the grid to be disabled or not disabled. Administrative
notice has been taken in the rules themselves of the number of unskilled jobs at various
exertional levels that exist throughout the national economy. 20 C.F.R. app. 2 S 200.00
(1981); Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291, 297 (2d Cir. 1981). The regulations discuss the
[Vol. 16:339
SURVEY-SOCIAL SECURITY
The claimant in Cummins was forty-nine years old, of limited
education, arthritic in his knees and right shoulder, mildly weakened
in his right side due to an automobile accident, and had suffered, out-
side the record on appeal, a recent heart attack. A potentially signifi-
cant nonexertional limitation was his blindness in one eye. By implica-
tion, the claimant would have been found disabled had he been fifty
years old, had unimpaired binocular vision, and suffered no heart
attack.
While Judge Posner recognized in Cummins that the statutory
criteria for disability are quite strict and that disability is not
synonymous with unemployment or even unemployability,' the Cum-
mins decision left uncertain the status of other undiscussed, recent
Seventh Circuit cases of a more liberal bent. Where Judge Posner
writes of the claimant in Cummins that "[p]ossibly his prospects of
obtaining substantial gainful employment of any kind ... have never
been more than theoretical,"93 the Seventh Circuit has previously held
that "[t]he mere theoretical ability to. engage in substantial, gainful
activity is insufficient to defeat an applicant's claim for disability
benefits."94
Judge Posner's opinion upholds the grid regulations95 against a
challenge to the effect that the regulations attempt, contrary to
statute, to dispense with the need for evidence of the existence, in
substantial numbers, of suitable jobs. The difficulty inherent in cross-
examining a grid as to whether particular unspecified sorts of jobs
are genuinely suitable for the claimant has rendered the grid regula-
tions controversial," despite their laudable aim of streamlining the
claimant's right to rebuttal only in the context of the various factual determinations
programmed into the grid, and not in the context of linking specific existing job types
with the claimant's capacities. 20 C.F.R. app. 2 5 200.00 (1981); Geoffroy v. Secretary
of HHS, 663 F.2d 315, 318 (1st Cir. 1981).
9 See 20 C.F.R. S 404.1566(c) (1981).
" 670 F.2d at 84.
9 Smith v. Secretary of HEW, 587 F.2d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam). See
also Stark v. Weinberger, 497 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1974); Schlabach v. Secretary of HEW,
469 F. Supp. 304, 316 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (focusing on the unrealism of supposing that
an employer would actually hire anyone with the impairments of the claimant).
"5670 F.2d at 83-84. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Chapman v. Schweiker, No. 81-1025 (10th Cir. Feb. 26, 1982) (available
June 28, 1982, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Newer file); Kirk v. Secretary of HHS, 667
F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding the regulations against several statutory and con-
stitutional objections); Salinas v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing
the use of administrative notice of jobs which claimant could perform in lieu of calling
a vocational expert to testify) (citing Frady v. Harris, 646 F.2d 143, 144-45 (4th Cir.
1981)). But see Davis v. Schweiker, 536 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Santise v. Harris,
501 F. Supp. 274, 277 (D.N.J. 1980) (discussed in Cummins), rev'd sub nor. Santise
v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 935 (3d Cir. 1982) (favorably citing Judge Posner's opinion
in Cummins). See also Desedare v. Secretary of HEW, 534 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Ark.
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disability adjudication process and increasing the uniformity of result9'
F. Statutory Developments
In addition to the legislative enactments mentioned in connection
with particular cases above, the past survey period was marked by
numerous potentially significant statutory developments.
The legislature, in one enactment, defined Community Action
Agencies and community action programs aimed at poverty reduction. 8
The legislature charged such agencies to be broadly representative
in composition and emphasized utilizing private sector resources in
closing social service gaps, coordinating the variety of social service
programs available, and focusing available resources on the most needy
persons.9'
Similarly, the legislature established a department on aging and
community services and a state commission on the aging and the aged
thereunder. ' °1 The legislative emphasis is on service coordination and
research, as well as advocacy, in areas such as health and nutrition,
transportation, and housing and employment counseling. Also, the role
of senior volunteer programs and the value of participation by the
aged in community life is noted." 1
Attorneys will note the absence, in the statute, of any explicit
recognition of the need of older citizens for the provision of legal
services."' In this area, as in others, the availability and stability of
1981); Stewart v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1981). Probably the most trenchant
criticism of the regulations relied upon in Cummins is to be found in Campbell v.
Secretary of HHS, 665 F.2d 48, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1981); Decker v. Harris, 647 F.2d 291,
298-99 (2d Cir. 1981); and Fisher v. Schweiker, 514 F. Supp. 119, 121 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
In turn, Decker has been criticized in Torres v. Secretary of HHS, 677 F.2d 167, 169
(1st Cir. 1982). The most recent case on point is Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351,
1360 (11th Cir. 1982) (striking down the grid's conclusive determination that persons
age 49 are able to adjust to new unskilled sedentary work as improperly ignoring
the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts).
97See 670 F.2d at 83.
9 IND. CODE SS 12-1-21-1 to -9 (1982).
"Id.
"'Id. SS 4-27-1-1 to -4-3.
°Id. S 4-27-3-1. The State of California provides an interesting contrast in more
explictly recognizing the role of older citizens as a collective social resource. "Older
persons constitute a fundamental resource of the state which previously has been under-
valued and poorly utilized, and . . . ways must be found to enable older people to
apply their competence, wisdom, and experience for the benefit of all .... " CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE S 9001(a) (West Supp. 1982). California thus approaches an explicit
distinction between older citizens as a productive community resource and older citizens
as social service consumers. It is arguable that the retired person seeking part-time
paid employment has less of an immediate community of interest with the chronically
impaired aged than with the active workforce.
"'In contrast, see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE S 9002(f)(8) (West Supp. 1982).
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state funding is of perhaps greater concern than coordination and
efficient utilization of programs, and Indiana has declined to follow
emulable models in this respect.1 3
In a related welfare area, an Indiana rehabilitation services agency
was established to receive gifts and bequests, to initiate and operate
programs related to the vocational rehabilitation of blind, visually im-
paired, and handicapped persons, and to operate, with federal govern-
ment approval, a disability determination division for the purpose of
adjudicating disability insurance and supplemental security income
claims under Social Security."'
Under another act,0 ' "health facilities" was defined0 6 and an
Indiana health facilities council established, with the latter being
empowered to adopt rules to protect patient health, safety, rights,
and welfare, along with the authority to conduct unannounced
inspections' 7 of health care facilities and to recommend to the State
Board of Health with respect to the issuance and revocation of licenses.
Provision is made for investigation and confidentiality of complaints,
and for imposition of appropriate sanctions for rule violations. The
most serious and unmitigated violations may result, after June 30,
1983, in the state health commissioner's ordering immediate correc-
tive action and imposing a fine of up to $10,000,"' along with license
revocation by the health facilities council on the commissioner's
recommendation.
Also, a nursing home prescreening program was established"° that
generally requires prior screening and approval for placement in a
nursing home by a multidisciplinary screening team "if the person
is currently or will within two (2) years be financially eligible for
assistance under the Federal Medicaid Program ... for the payment
of any part of the cost of care provided in a health facility.""0. The
-°'See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW SS 536-a4(b), 541 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1972-1981) (pro-
viding for at least partial or limited state reimbursement of approved local expend-
itures for community services to the elderly).
'O'[ND. CODE S 16-7-17-1 to -15 (1982).
Id. SS 16-10-4-1 to -29.
"Id. S 16-10-4-2(a). Significant exclusions are made with respect to the scope of
"health facility." See id. S 16-10-4-2(b).
"Id. S 16-10-4-7(b). For an excellent discussion of the fourth amendment constitu-
tionality of unannounced warrantless inspections of health care facilities limited by
statute to reasonable times, see People v. Firstenberg, 92 Cal. App. 3d 570, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 80 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
"IND. CODE S 16-10-4-15(c)(1)(A) (1982). For a thorough discussion of several issues
involved in the imposition of substantial civil fines by administrative agencies, see
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 46 Ill. App. 3d 412, 361 N.E.2d
23 (1977).
'"IND. CODE SS 12-1-22-1 to -6 (1982).
"01d. S 12-1-22-2(a). Cf ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. S 11-293 (Supp. 1981) (conditioning eligi-
bility for nursing home placement on preadmission screening of the individual indigent).
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screening process involves an assessment of whether placement in
a nursing home is appropriate in light of the applicant's medical needs
and the availability and cost-effectiveness of alternatives to nursing
home care. Nonparticipation by the applicant in the preadmission
screening program bars the person's eligibility for Medicaid assistance
in connection with services provided by the nursing home for two
years after admission.'
Finally, the legislature established a State Medicaid Fraud Con-
trol Unit"1 2 under applicable federal statutory authority.' 3 Provision
is made for the referral of unresolved cases of suspected overpayments
or improper payments to Medicaid providers to the Medicaid Fraud
Control Unit, which may in turn refer the matter to the appropriate
prosecutor."'
'This provision is probably defensible against an equal protection or due process
challenge in light of the federal statutory mandate of 42 U.S.C. S 1396(a)(26)(A) (Supp.
IV 1980) and the "broad discretion" conferred on the states in adopting standards
with respect to eligibility for Medicaid assistance. See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444
(1977). See also Blum v. Yaretsky, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982). The Medicaid "freedom of
choice" policy of section 1396(a)(23) would not seem to be literally implicated, though
conscientious, religiously based objections to the preadmission screening would raise
constitutional questions.
"'IND. CODE SS 4-6-10-1 to -2 (1982).
"342 U.S.C. S 1396b(q) (Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of the Federal Medicare-
Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, see H. MCCORMICK, MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES 9-15 (Supp. 1981).
"4 IND. CODE S 12-1-7-15.8 to -15.9 (1982).
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